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INTRODUCTION, MAIN CONCEPTS AND RESULTS
In a decentralized setting in which players can interact with each other and get together in groups, the game theoretic predictions are that a matching that can be upset by a coalition will not occur. When preferences are strict, the outcome of such coalitional interactions should then be a stable matching, if it exists. However, such predictions should be revised in the cases in which preferences are not necessarily strict.
In such cases, it is justifiable that recontracts between pairs of agents already allocated according to a stable matching, leading to a weak Pareto improvement of the original matching, should be allowed. In this context, it makes sense to predict that only Paretostable matchings, i.e. stable matchings that are Pareto optimal, will occur. This paper takes up this approach and proves some characteristic properties of the Pareto-stable matchings. It concentrates on the well-known Roommate and Marriage models, both introduced by Gale and Shapley in their famous paper of 1962. We follow the notations and concepts presented in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) . The Roommate model is described as the pair (N,P), where N={1,2,…,n} is the set of players and P is the set {P(1),…,P(n)}, where P(j) is an ordered list of preferences (strict or nonstrict) for player j. The Marriage model is regarded as a sub-model of the Roommate model in which N=M∪W, M is a set of men and W is a set of women. For the sake of exposition the main concepts will be introduced along this section, as well as the main results of this paper, which will be presented, motivated, discussed and illustrated with examples. We will not always provide a formal statement. The intuitive proofs will be provided here and the technical proofs will be presented in the next section.
To figure out the kind of coalitional interaction taking place among agents allocated according to a stable matching that is not Pareto-optimal, see Example 1 below.
Example 1. (Pareto-stability is a natural solution concept for the roommate model)
Consider a decentralized setting where a set of eight boys, 1,2,…,8, wish divide up into pairs of roommates. The boys' preferences over acceptable partners are represented by the following ordered lists, where P(j) denotes boy j's list for all j=1,…,8: P(1)=8, 2, 1 P(5)=8, 6, 5 P(2)=[3, 1], 2 P(6)=[3, 5], 6 P(3)=2,6, 4, 3 P(7)=4, 8, 7
P(4)= [3, 7] , 4 P(8)= [1, 5, 7] , 8
The brackets in the preference lists of boys 2, 4, 6 and 8 mean that these agents are indifferent among the boys inside the brackets. The matching z, where z(1)=2, z(3)=4, z(5)=6, z(7)=8, doesn't have any blocking pair, so it is stable. This means that no two boys can be both better off by becoming roommates.
However, we cannot expect to observe this matching as the final outcome. In fact, boy 3 prefers boy 6 to his partner, boy 4; in his turn boy 6 is indifferent between boy 3 and his partner, boy 5; boy 5 prefers boy 8 to his partner, boy 6; boy 8 is indifferent between boy 5 and his partner, boy 7; on the other hand boy 7
prefers boy 4 to his partner, boy 8 and boy 4 is indifferent between boy 7 and his partner boy 3. Thus, boys 3, 5 and 7 can act together and be better off by exchanging their partners 6, 8 and 4 among them. It is natural to expect that this exchange will be accepted by 6, 8 and 4 , since these boys are indifferent between their current partners under z and the new proposed mates. It is then reasonable to expect that these boys will form a new set of partnerships, {3,6}, {5,8} and {7,4}, and that matching w, such that w(1)=2, w(3)=6, w(5)=8 and w(7)=4, will be the resulting matching of this coalitional interaction. Matching w is a weak Pareto improvement of matching z via coalition {3,4,5,6,7,8}, which weakly blocks matching z. Since a weak Pareto improvement of a matching does not create any blocking pair, and z is stable, then matching w is also stable.
Considering that an exchange of partners is acceptable if it does not hurt anybody, it is then evident that an exchange of partners is acceptable only if (1) the agents involved are either all indifferent between their current partners and the new ones or they form a weak blocking coalition and (2) by matching the agents of the weak blocking coalition among them in an appropriate way, a weak Pareto improvement of the current matching is obtained.
Having this in mind observe that once matching w is reached no more acceptable exchange of partners is possible. In fact, boys 7 and 5 are assigned to their first choice, so there is no acceptable exchange involving these boys and their partners.
On the other hand, any exchange involving some of the remaining boys will necessarily involve boy 8, partner of boy 5, who will not accept such pairwise interaction. Hence, although z and w are stable, only w can be expected to occur.
The pairs {3,2} and {1,8,} are the only weak blocking pairs of matching w but the coalition {3,2,1,8} does not produce any weak Pareto-improvement of w. Matching z is also weakly blocked but only w is Pareto-stable.
Observe that in this example coalition {1,2,3,4,7,8} also weakly blocks matching z, and yields a weak Pareto-improvement given by the matching w', which assigns 1 to 8, 2 to 3, 4 to 7 and 5 to 6. This new matching is also Pareto-stable.
No more acceptable exchange of partners will occur. That is, matching x is Pareto-simple if it is simple and it is not weaklydominated by any other simple matching. Pareto-simple matchings always exist since the set of simple matchings is non-empty, finite and preferences are transitive.
The following example, due to Gale and Shapley (1962) , shows that the set of Pareto-simple matchings may be disjoint from the set of Pareto-optimal matchings, as well as from the set of Pareto-stable matchings. The set of Pareto-stable matchings is empty. There is no Pareto-simple matching that is Pareto-optimal. In fact, matching x where every agent is unmatched is the only simple matching because any other matching has a blocking pair where at least one boy is matched. Then it is Pareto-simple. However, it is not Pareto-optimal since it is weakly dominated by, for example, matching x 1 , which matches 1 to 2 and 3 to 4.
Matching x 1 is Pareto-optimal but it is not simple. The set of Pareto-optimal matchings also includes x 2 , which matches 1 to 3 and 2 to 4 and x 3 which matches 1 to 4 and 3 to 2. g
The set of Pareto-stable matchings may be a non-empty proper subset of the set of Pareto-simple matchings and of the set of Pareto-optimal matchings, as illustrated in the example below.
Example 3. (Pareto-stable matchings is a non-empty proper subset of the set of Pareto-
simple matchings and of the set of Pareto-optimal matchings.) Consider the Roommate model where the set of boys is N={1,2,…,6}. The boys' preferences over acceptable partners are given by:
The set of stable matchings is non-empty since matching y, such that y(1)=2, y(3)=5 and y(4)=6, is stable. This is the only stable matching for this market. Since any Pareto-improvement of y must be stable then y is Pareto-optimal, so it is Paretostable and Pareto-simple. The pair {5,4} weakly blocks y, so the set of strongly stable matchings is empty. Now, let y' be the matching that assigns 5 to 4 and leaves unmatched the other boys. It is easy to see that y' is simple and unstable. On the other hand, there is no way to extend y' to a simple matching. In fact, boy 5 is matched to his first choice. Consequently, any weak-Pareto-improvement of y' will only involve the unmatched boys. However, any arrangement with these boys will have a blocking pair where at least one boy is matched. Then, any weak-Pareto-improvement of y' is not simple, so y' is a Pareto-simple matching. Since it is not stable then it is not Paretostable. Matching y' is not Pareto-optimal, since matching z' that assigns 5 to 4, 1 to 2 and leaves unmatched the other agents, for example, is a weak-Pareto improvement of y'. However, matching z' is not simple since the pair {2,3} blocks it and boy 2 is matched. Then, z' is Pareto-optimal but it is not Pareto-stable.g
As these examples suggest, the set of Pareto-stable matchings is the intersection of two non-empty Pareto sets:
Theorem 1. The set of Pareto-stable matchings equals the intersection of the set of
Pareto-simple matchings with the set of Pareto-optimal matchings.
The proof of this result is straightforward. If a matching is Pareto-stable then it is simple and it is not weakly dominated by any individually rational matching, in particular it is not weakly dominated by any simple matching, so it is a Pareto-simple matching. Conversely, if a matching is simple and Pareto-optimal then it must be stable, since otherwise it would have a blocking pair formed with unmatched agents and so, by matching these agents with each other, we would get a weak-Pareto-improvement of the given matching, which would contradict its Pareto-optimality. The proof of Proposition 1-(a) uses a key lemma. This is a technical result, which is a one-sided version of the Decomposition lemma for the Marriage model from Gale and Sotomayor (1985) . For part (b), the proof strongly uses the fact that the Marriage model has two sides.
By Proposition 1, in order to conclude that the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the Roommate model with strict preferences is empty, it is enough to find just one Pareto-simple and unstable matching. See the example below.
Example 4. (An application of Proposition 1-(a))
Consider the Roommate model where the set of boys is N={1,2,…,7}. The boys' preferences over acceptable partners are
given by: P(1)=5, 6, 1 P(4)=6, 5, 4 P(7)=2, 1, 3, 7 P(2)=3, 7, 2 P(5)=4, 1, 6, 5 P(3)=7, 2, 3 P(6)=1, 4, 6
The matching that assigns 4 to 5, 1 to 6 and leaves the other agents unmatched is simple and unstable. Any extension of this matching will match a pair of agents in {2,3,7}. However, one of the agents in the pair will form a blocking pair with the agent left unmatched. Hence, the original matching does not have a simple extension. Since the preferences are strict, we need not check that every Pareto-simple matching is unstable. (Observe that the matching that assigns 4 to 6, 1 to 5 and leaves the other agents unmatched is also Pareto-simple and unstable). Proposition 1 implies that the set of stable matchings is empty, so the set of Pareto-stable matchings is also empty. g
The following corollary is then immediate: known that the existence of two sides in the Marriage market causes fundamental differences between the two models. There are properties of the Marriage model which depend on the two-sidedness of the market, as the non-emptiness of the set of stable matchings under any kind of preferences and the lattice property of the set of stable matchings when preferences are strict. This last property guarantees the existence of the optimal stable matchings for each side of the market. Moreover, it implies that if the two optimal stable matchings coincide then the set of stable matchings is a singleton.
When preferences need not be strict, the lattice property may fail to hold even when the man-optimal and the woman-optimal stable matchings exist. Moreover, the manoptimal stable matching may coincide with the woman-optimal stable matching when the set of stable matchings is not a singleton. See the example below. clearly optimal for the men and for the women but matching y 1 is also stable. g
The key lemma mentioned above is also used in this paper to extend, to the Roommate model with strict preferences, two well-known properties for the Marriage model with strict preferences. The first result reflects an opposition of interests between the two players involved in a partnership regarding two Pareto-stable matchings. It asserts that if x and y are Pareto-stable matchings and j prefers x to y then j is matched under both matchings and both of his mates prefer y to x. The second result implies that the set of trading agents at a simple matching can be regarded as a sort of stable coalition in the sense that such agents always make their transactions under a stable matching within the same pool. In particular, the set of matched agents under a Pareto-stable matching is the same under any Pareto-stable matching. The proof of both results will be given in the next section.
The present work also addresses the case of non-necessarily strict preferences.
Similar results to those stated under the assumption of strict preferences, by focusing on strongly stable matchings and strongly simple matchings, are obtained and presented in section 3. The proofs of these results follow the lines of the proofs of the corresponding results under strict preferences and are left to the reader. Some final conclusions and related work are presented in the last section.
TECHNICAL PROOFS
The following result is a technical lemma that will be used to prove some of our results. The idea is the following. Given a pair of matchings, one stable and the other simple, non-necessarily stable, the set of agents who prefer one matching to the other can be decomposed into two disjoint sets, such that the agents from one set are matched to the agents of the other set under both matchings. A special case of this result, in which both matchings are stable, was obtained in Gale and Sotomayor (1985) for the Marriage model and called by these authors Decomposition lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose the preferences are strict. Consider the Roommate model (N,P).

Let x be a simple matching and let y be a stable matching. Let T={j∈N; x(j)≠j}, M x ={j∈N; x(j) > j y(j)} and M y ={j∈T; y(j) > j x(j)}. Then x(M x )= y(M x )=M y and x(M y )=y(M y )=M x .
Proof. First observe that all j in M x are matched under x and all j in M y are matched under y. If j is in M x then x(j)≠y(j) and k=x(j) is in M y , for otherwise the strictness of the preferences will imply that j=x(k) > k y(k), so y will be blocked by j and k, which contradicts the assumption that y is stable. On the other hand, if k is in M y then y(k)≠x(k) and j=y(k) is in M x , for if not the strictness of the preferences will imply that k=y(j) > j x(j), so x will be blocked by j and k. However, k is in T, so k is matched under x, which contradicts the fact that x is simple. Therefore, 
WHEN PREFERENCES NEED NOT BE STRICT
If we relax the assumption of strictness of the preferences, we can obtain similar results to those presented in the previous section by focusing on strongly stable matchings and strongly simple matchings. The proofs of these results are trivial adaptations of the proofs presented in section 2 and will be left to the reader.
Definition 3. The matching x is strongly simple if it is individually rational and no matched agent is part of a weak blocking pair. Matching x is called Pareto-strongly simple if it is strongly simple and it is not weakly dominated by any strongly simple
matching.
Clearly, the matching where every agent is unmatched is strongly simple. Also, if a matching is strongly stable then it is strongly simple. From the definition above, if a matching is Pareto-simple and strongly simple then it is Pareto-strongly simple. If a matching is strongly stable then it is Pareto-optimal and strongly simple, so it is Pareto-strongly simple. A sort of converse is given by Proposition 2 that asserts that under the assumption that the set of strongly stable matchings is non-empty, we have that every Pareto-strongly simple matching is strongly stable. Properties 3 and 4 are the corresponding extensions of Properties 1 and 2 to the case in which preferences are non-necessarily strict. The proofs of these three results use the straightforward extension of Lemma 1 where stable and simple are replaced by strongly stable and strongly simple, respectively, with the adequate adaptations.
Proposition 2. Suppose the set of strongly stable matchings is non-empty. Then, the set of Pareto-strongly simple matchings equals the set of strongly stable matchings.
Property 3. Let x and y be strongly stable matchings for the Roommate model (N,P).
If j prefers x to y then k=x(j)≠j, for some k, and h=y(j)≠j, for some h≠k.
Furthermore, both k and h prefer y to x.
The following corollary asserts that there is an opposition of interests between the two sides of the Marriage market along the whole set of strongly-stable matchings. 4 Knuth (1976) proved this result for the case where preferences are strict. 5 This result was proved for the Marriage market and for the College admission market with strict preferences by Gale and Sotomayor (1985a,b) . A different proof is provided by McVitie and Wilson (1970) for the particular Marriage market where all men and women are mutually acceptable. For the College admission model, Roth (1986) proved that if a college does not fill its quota under some stable matching then it is matched to the same set of students under every stable matching.
CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK.
Basically, we can identify four sets, each a superset of the next: The weak Pareto frontier, the set of stable matchings, the set of Pareto-stable matchings and the set of strongly stable matchings. The set of stable matchings is always a subset of the set of weak Pareto-optimal matchings, understood as those allocations for which the grand coalition cannot strongly block, i.e., the grand coalition does not cause a strict Pareto improvement. We proved that when preferences are strict the three last sets coincide.
With indifferences, Pareto-stability plays the role of an intermediate solution concept:
the set of Pareto-stable matchings may be a proper subset of the set of stable matchings and may properly contain the set of strongly stable matchings. It is non-empty when the set of stable matchings is non-empty.
Of course we may have Pareto-optimal matchings that are unstable. However, if a Pareto-optimal matching is simple then it is stable. In fact, we characterized the set of the matching where every player is unmatched, if it is unstable), it is possible to gradually increase cooperation by making weak-Pareto improvements and still staying within the set of simple matchings, until no pairwise transaction is able to benefit all agents involved, or until the matching cannot be simple anymore. In the former case a stable matching has been reached. In the latter case, the set of stable matchings is empty, so increase in payoffs is only available through non-optimal (in the selfish sense) cooperation of some agents. These weak-Pareto improvements produce a finite sequence of simple matchings that keep the current trades and add new ones, leading to a Pareto-simple matching. Thus, once a transaction is done, it will not be undone at the subsequent matching. Only agents who are not currently trading are able, by trading among them, to be better off.
This dynamics can be identified, for example, in the steps of the Top Trading
Cycles algorithm due to Gale, for the Housing market of Shapley and Scarf (1974) .
Each cycle formed by the Top Trading Cycles algorithm produces a simple allocation, defined in the straightforward manner for the Housing model (see Sotomayor, 2005) . In each step one more cycle is added. The sequence of such simple allocations converges to a core outcome as soon as no more cycles can be added. proposing. The matching produced in each step of this algorithm is semi-simple and it is a weak Pareto-improvement of the simple matching in which every agent is unmatched.
However our approach is different since: (i) we do not require to break ties when preferences are not strict; (ii) the initial point of our sequence need not be the matching where everyone is unmatched, so (iii) the final matching is not necessarily the manoptimal stable matching.
This justifies Pareto-stability.
Stability and Pareto optimality only for the students were required in Erdil and Ergin (2007) to replace the standard concept of student optimal stable matching for the school choice model. That is, according to this concept, a stable matching is called a "student optimal stable matching" if no stable matching is weakly preferred by all students to that matching. These authors present a simple procedure to compute a "student optimal stable matching", under the assumption that priorities are weak and the preferences of the students are strict. In this model, since preferences of schools are not considered, the exchange of partners does not always produce a weak Pareto improvement of the given matching and it does not always yield a stable matching.
Then, in order to compute a stable and Pareto optimal matching for the students, the authors considered exchange of partners only inside a stable improvement cycle, defined as a cycle of students who each prefer the school to which the next student in the cycle is matched, and each of whom is one of the school's most preferred candidates among the students who prefer that school to their current match. Therefore, a stable improvement cycle produces a stable matching in which some schools may be worse off and the students of the cycle are strictly better off. Starting with a student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with arbitrary tie-breaking of non-strict preferences by schools, the authors construct a computationally efficient algorithm which, in each step, improves the current matching for the students, by finding and satisfying stable improvement cycles, until no more remain. The outcome of such an algorithm is then a stable matching that is Pareto optimal with respect to students.
The idea of proving the non-emptiness of the core by showing that every Paretosimple outcome must be stable has been explored in the literature via adaptations of the concept formulated here of simple matching. In Sotomayor (2005) , for example, it was introduced the concept of simple allocation for the one-sided market (not matching market) of Shapley and Scarf (1974) . There, it was proved that every Pareto-simple allocation must be in the core.
For the two-sided matching models it has been more convenient to work with the concept of semi-simple outcome, whose discrete version was introduced in Sotomayor (1996) for the Marriage market. The extension of this concept to a general discrete many-to-many matching market (in particular, to the College Admission model), where preferences are substitutable and non-necessarily strict, was introduced in Sotomayor (1999) to prove the non-emptiness of the set of pairwise-stable matchings. A similar idea was used in Sotomayor (2004) to show the existence of Nash equilibria in an implementation mechanism for the discrete many-to-many matching model. The continuous version of that concept was used in Sotomayor (2000) for the Assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) and for a unified two-sided matching model. problem, an immediate corollary of it is that a random process that begins from an arbitrary matching and continues by satisfying a randomly selected blocking pair must eventually converge with probability one to a stable matching, provided each blocking pair has a probability of being selected that is bounded away from zero. This corollary has given origin to several other papers. Chung (2000) , for example, proves that this random-paths-to-stability result applies to the Roommate model under the assumption of non-necessarily strict preferences, as long as some sufficient condition for the existence of stable matchings, called no-odd-rings, is satisfied. If the no-odd-ring condition is not satisfied but preferences are strict and stable matchings exist then the Roth and Vande Vate path still converges to a stable matching (Diamantoudi et al. 2004 ). Inarra, Larrea and Molis (2008) generalizes for the Roommate model the result of Diamantoudi et al. (2004) , and consequently that of Chung (2000) under strict preferences and the one of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) . They prove that from any matching for the Roommate model with strict preferences, there exists a path, given by a proposal-rejection procedure, which reaches a specific matching 6 that has the property to be stable when the set of stable matchings is non-empty. Kojima and Unver (2006) study the convergence to stability in many-to-many matching models. Klaus and Klijn (2007) analyze this convergence for matching markets with couples.
The presence of indifference in the preferences of the agents in the discrete matching models, affecting the existence of strongly stable matchings, has been considered by several authors. Irving (1994) , for example, formulated an O(n 4 )
algorithm for determining whether a given instance of the Marriage model, with n men and n women and complete lists of non-necessarily strict preferences, admits a strongly stable matching and for constructing one if it does. An extension of this algorithm by allowing incomplete lists of preferences is presented in Manlove (1999) .
Irving, Manlove and Scott (2000) present an algorithm to determine whether a given instance of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with indifferences admits a super-stable matching and, if it does, to construct such a matching. They define a super-stable matching x as a stable matching for which there is no pair, resident/hospital, not matched to each other, such that (a) the resident is indifferent between his partner and the hospital and (b) the hospital is indifferent between its worst partner and the resident.
